United States/Soviet Military Balance by Collins, John M. & Severns, Elizabeth Ann
UNITED STATES/SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE 
(ARCHIVED--12/03/81) 
ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB78029 
AUTHOR: 
Collins, J o h n  M. 
Senior Specialist in National Defense 
Severns, Elizabeth Ann 
Reference Assistant, Office of Senior Specialists 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
KAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM 
DATE ORIGINATED 03/20/78 
DATE .UPDATED 01/04/82 




American military competence spanned a much larger functional and 
geographic sphere in support of security interests than Soviet armed services 
could cover for the Kremlin before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. U.S. 
forces have registered many improvements since that time, but their relative 
decline has been dramatic when compared with Soviet counterparts. 
President Kennedy told MOSCOW in 1962 to remove its ballistic missiles 
from Cuba or face U.S. military action. Soviet Premier Khrushchev complied. 
President Carter, who flatly stated that "the status quo is not acceptable," 
asked Moscow to remove its combat brigade in October 1979, and Soviet 
President Brezhnev refused. Those confrontations, sf course, are not 
strictly analogous, but the shift in strength since the first showdown has 
clearly reinforced U.S. risks around the world and reduced our room for 
maneuver. 
This brief sketches the situation in 1960 before the Soviet buildup began, 
depicts the present balance, and identifies some significant issues for U.S. 
defense decisionmakers. (See statistical tables at the end of this text.) 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
BALANCE BEFORE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISPS 
The U.S./Soviet military balance was not bad from our standpoint in 1960. 
This country's deterrent threats and defensive contingents were credible in 
most respects. 
America's main aim, called containment, accepted the status quo at that 
time. We lacked means to retake lost territory, but U.S. military services, 
in concert with allies, were sufficient to safeguard the Free World from 
Soviet armed aggression. 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) possessed unparalleled powers, when ballistic 
missiles on both sides were neither numerous nor very accurate. Its bombers 
could burst through the pervious screen that protected our opponent, but the 
small force of Soviet Bears and Bisons would have found U-S. 
defenses-in-depth much more difficult. Medium-range Badgers could strike 
American targets on one-way suicide missions only if they flew high to 
conserve fuel. That shortcoming kept them vulnerable, in full view of U.S. 
and Canadian surveillance systems. Our "short-legged" B-47s, which were 
forward-based or programmed for in-flight refueling, could make fairly 
lengthy low-level bomb runs beneath Soviet radar fans and below the best 
fields of fire for their surface-to-air missiles (SAMSs). 
Nuclear supremacy also underpinned U.S. strategy in Europe. No pressing 
Soviet military threat was apparent in other theaters. Moscow could not 
employ medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs, IRBMs) 
CRS- 2 IB78029 UPDATE-01/04/82 
against NATO's tempting center sector without risking retaliatory strikes 
against critical targets in Russia. NATO, conversely, could tolerate 
conventional inferiority in land formations, because theater nuclear weapons 
still could take up the slack. 
Inflexible Soviet forces were clearly outclassed in every other category. 
U.S. tactical air forces were far superior to Frontal Aviation, which 
promised poor support for fast-moving offensive operations if Red Army 
logistics failed to fold first. Gorshkov's coastal navy could not yet 
contest our control of the seas. His submarines might have been able to cut 
U.S. lines of communication to Europe, but with minor implications, because 
NATO's reinforcement and resupply requirements reputedly were of reduced 
moment. Massive nuclear retaliation would conclude any conflict quickly, 
according to U.S. concepts, without resort to costly attrition in the air or 
on the ground. 
In short, U.S. Armed Services, assisted by allies, held Soviet forces in 
check across the conflict spectrum. Reserves were on tap to contend with 
contingencies where the Kremlin could not reach. 
BALANCE IN 1981 
Few trends that typify the U.S./Soviet military balance from America's 
perspective have been positive for the past two decades. 
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR TRENDS 
U.S. nuclear capabilities have passed through three distinct stages since 
1960. Each was less adaptable than its predecessor. 
The current version features far fewer realistic options than its first 
forerunner, largely because we now lack any Credible means of controlling 
escalation and can no longer protect either the American people or our 
production base. U.S. threats of massive retaliation comprised a believable 
brake when our side enjoyed nuclear superiority in almost every sense, but 
whether we mean business is a big question today. 
U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers are more 
vulnerable to attack than ever before. That condition erodes the stability 
of our national security, even though no current combination of Soviet 
assaults could smother the two systems simultaneously. Soviet counterparts 
are comparatively secure, because of our second-strike strategy. 
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on both sides are still safe at 
sea, given the current state of the art in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 
although that situation conceivably could change with little notice. 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
The present and projected balance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs creates 
two central consequences. One involves the pre-launch survival of undefended 
American missiles. The other concerns comparative capabilities to attack and 
destroy land-based ICBMs. 
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Installing more U-S. ICBMs would prove impractical, because the Soviets 
could add hard target warheads much faster than we could build silos and fill 
them with missiles, at a fraction of the cost. Reinforcing U.S. silos faces 
finite limitations, such as the ultimate compressive strength of concrete, 
Launch-on-warning would jmprove survivability only if our alert system 
remained intact. Should it fail for any reason, including Soviet action, 
chances are slim that any decision to launch could be made, much less 
implemented, in the few minutes available. 
Substituting some sort of semi-mobile land-based missile system for all or 
part of our stationary ICMBs, therefore, is under active consideration- 
Costs would be Considerable but, because mobile missiles are more difficult 
to hit than those in silos, there would be no need to replace Minutemen on a 
one-for-one basis. 
Deterrent properties of all concepts under consideration depend on 
proliferating, rather than removing., aim points. Rivals, faced with 
prospects of expending huge numbers of nuclear weapons without assurance of 
preventing U.S. response, presumably would find risk-versus-gain ratios 
poor. Should that assumption, however, prove false, the side effects o f  
saturation attacks, especially fallout, could create more problems than they 
solve. 
The search for a faster, cheaper, more effective fix thus may remain in 
the offing. Fresh looks at free mobility models, land, sea, and air, could 
be among the options. See Issue Brief 77046 for detailed discussion. 
Countersilo Capabilities 
America's ICBMs, constrained by our second-strike strategy, would not 
likely match Moscow's countersilo capabilities, even if we deployed bigger 
missiles, more multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 
and greater accuracy, all of which are properties of MX. 
Should the Soviets, after conducting a first strike, choose to launch 
reserve ICBMs on warning, our warheads could destroy superhard silos, but not 
before the missiles in them took flight. Such action actually could invite 
additional devastation in the United States. Catching a few Soviet reserves 
in their silos and preventing refirings from "cold launch" facilities would 
afford slight comfort in such circumstances. "Essential equivalencern is 
short, would remain elusive even if U.S. and Soviet ICBM holdings were 
precisely the same in quantities and technical characteristics. 
Strategic Air Power 
The U.S. accent on strategic air power - is still strong. Soviet stress has 
been slight since the Cuban missile crisis, although supersonic Backfire 
bombers, which began to deploy in 1975, cause increasing ContrGVerSy. The 
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present bomber balance affects U.S. force requirements in two significant 
ways: one concerns perceptions; the other concerns security. 
Backfire Bombers Related to U.S. Bombers 
Soviet Backfire bombers may have some bearing on U.S. needs for improved 
air defense, but are unrelated to our offensive force requirements. Backfire 
squadrons, which currently contribute less to Soviet strategic nuclear 
capabilities than forward-based fighters add to ours, could double in number 
or disappear without diluting any advantages that accrue from Strategic Air 
Command's aircraft. Manned bombers may indeed be a legitimate leg of the 
U.S. triad, but maintaining superiority, essential equivalence, or any other 
balance with Backfires wquld serve some symbolic purpose, nothing more. 
Bombers Replaced by Cruise Missiles 
President Carter on June 30, 1977, disclosed his decision to cancel 
prospective production of B-1 bombers, which were scheduled to strengthen our 
triad in the 1980s. The Pentagon anticipates converting 151 B-52Gs to carry 
20 air-launched cruise missiles (A.LCMs) apiece, for a total of 3,020 weapons. 
Only about 75 B-52s will be modernized to improve penetration probabilities 
against future Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and interceptor 
aircraft. 
Implications of that determination are subject to debate. Cruise missile 
technology tactics are still uncertain. Proposed B-52 modification programs 
pfesent many problems. Most important, abilities of U.S. ALCMS to penetrate 
Soviet defenses-in-depth is in dispute. 
In the final analysis, therefore, U.S. security will be well served by 
substituting ALCMs for aircraft only if satisfactory capabilities can be 
deployed at acceptable costs in time to support stated strategy. If not, our 
deterrent could suffer. 
STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROBLEMS 
CONUS (Continental United States) defense plays almost no part in U.S. 
nuclear strategy. Deterrence depends almost entirely on powers to survive 
preemptive strikes, then savage the aggressor. The Soviets conversely seek 
to develop credible safeguards. A "vulnerability gap" of disputed 
proportions consequently grows. 
Analysts at one end of the spectrum contend that Soviet air and civil 
defense abilities, abetted by detailed plans, psychological conditioning, and 
physical preparations, already degrade U.S. deterrence and place this country 
in peril. Some noted U.S. specialists speculate that crisis relocation 
procedures would limit Soviet fatalities to 4 or 5% during a general war, 
under Worst-case Conditions. Official estimates indicate that almost half 
the American people would die, and another 35 million would require medical 
attention. If those casualty ratios were even close to correct, U.S. 
capability to deter attack would indeed be "a myth," as some claim, since 
U.S. deterrence is predicated on an "assured destructionw capability, meaning 
the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor. draw less 
drastic conclusions. Most concede that the 
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Skeptics draw less drastic conclusions. Most concede that the Kremlin 
stresses city defense, but doubt that U.S. deterrence is in danger. One 
faction, for example, sees this as a spurious issue. Its followers believe 
that nuclear blasts can break through the best protection. Others, whose 
opinions are widely shared, suspect that Soviet defensive capabilities, while 
significant, are overstated. U.S. over-reaction, they contend, could be just 
as ruinous as complacency. 
Nevertheless, students of the subject seem to agree that Soviet active and 
passive defenses in combination ape beginning to create a survivability 
imbalance that favors the Soviets. ~ s s e r t i o n s  that they soon could survive a 
general war appear premature, but long-term consequences could be severe if 
the trend proceeds too far. Civil defense would assume a completely 
different connotation, if accompanied by Soviet breakthroughs in 
antisubmarine or antiballistic missile (ASW, ABM) warfare. Active defense in 
that case would provide the primary shield. Civil defense, a s  part of a 
strategic defensive triad, would simply serve as a backstop. 
Any amalgam that allowed the Soviets to evade "assured destruction," while -
America still could not, would, in fact, allow them to satisfy the true aim 
of strategy, which is "not so much to seek battle as to seek a...situation so 
advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the desired decision, 
its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this." 
Stated succinctly, the side that solves defensive equations first would 
attain true nuclear superiority, expressed in terms of survival prospects 
despite the rival's raw destructive power. Supremacy without defense appears 
to be unattainable regardless of offensive numbers, as long as each side can 
devastate or destroy the other. 
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCE TRENDS 
U.S. general purpose forces have developed quite differently than Soviet 
counterparts. 
Soviet leaders, who implicitly prefer a Principle of War called "Mass," 
rarely reduce force levels, and winnow out stocks only when they cease to 
serve useful purposes. U.S. defense decisionmakers are partial to "Economy 
of Force." Quality, not quantity, is considered essential. America's armed 
services consequently are cut severely after every war. Outmoded weapons 
customarily retire when new ones enter the inventory. 
Soviet strength thus dilates, even when ours declines. U.S. quality at 
this stage can no longer compensate completely for the lack of flexibility 
caused by quantitative inferiority. 
GROUND FORCE PROBLEMS 
Huge conscript ground forces are the traditional source of Soviet general 
purpose force strength. Other services are subsidiary, despite the emergence 
of a modern air force and navy. The much smaller U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
currently consist of volunteers. Quantitative gaps that favor the Soviet 
Union are great in nearly every category. 
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U.S. Strengths 
Our Army has access to firepower unprecedented in the past. Tanks with 
stabilized turrets and night sights can attack targets on the move, in 
daylight or darkness. What they see, they can generally stop. Our TOW 
antitank weapons not only exceed the range of Soviet tank cannons, but 
possess penetration powers that outpaced opposing armor by the mid-1970s. 
Improved artillery ammunition can cause up to four times as many personnel 
casualties per round as conventional high explosives could in past conflicts. 
Projectiles with time-delay submunitions extend suppression capabilities for 
protracted periods after impact. Laser range finders for forward observers 
reduce target estimation errors from 400 meters to about 10, hugely 
increasing probabilities of first-round hits. Response times have been cut 
from minutes to seconds. Precision-guided artillery projectiles, when 
perfected, should cause a quantum jump in destructive power. Land mine 
lethality has increased dramatically in this decade. 
U.S. Shortcomings 
There are points, however, beyond which mass matters more than excellence. 
The U.S. Army has just 16 active divisions. The Marine Corps has three. A 
fourth of our Army divisions lack one regular brigade. Others lack one or 
more active maneuver battalions. Readiness is reduced, even though reserve 
component "roundouts" train part time with Regular Army divisions. Only a 
few of those 19 divisions are free 'for contingency purposes without slighting 
commitments and spreading the force very thin. 
Eight Army National Guard and one Marine Corps Reserve divisions complete 
the U.S. complement of major maneuver units. Nine or ten weeks of 
post-mobilization training would be needed to bring armored and mechanized 
divisions up to minimum combat standards, after they were called to active 
duty following the declaration of a national emergency, which can be 
designated only by the President or Congress. Consequently, they are poorly 
prepared to participate in any "come as you are party," such as those 
contemplated by our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). 
Soviet ground forces, in contrast, retain a comfortable cushion of 
reserves that could create multiple contingencies on call. Seven airborne 
divisions in first-class shape afford special flexibility. U.S. 
decisionmakers would find it difficult to determine priorities if the 
Politburo brought things to a boil around Berlin, encouraged a crisis in 
Korea, and simultaneously made military motions toward the Middle East. 
Successful feints could spoil U.S. plans to suppor-t friends under fire, or 
forestall U.S. action until too late, if we feared premature commitment of 
our few divisions in strategic reserve would expose the true point of 
decision. 
The Doctrinal Dilemma 
Few forces, coupled with seccnd-strike, selective containment policies, 
dictate a defensive doctrine for our Army at the onset of any conflict 
against numerically superior Soviet forces or the Warsaw Pact. U.S. 
commanders are advised to Concentrate winning combinations at proper times 
and places, "using reserves from the rearw and forces "from less threatened 
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f l a n k s , "  w h i c h  r e m a i n  l i g h t l y  c o v e r e d .  S h o u l d  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o c c u r  a t  t h e  
w r o n g  s p o t ,  t h e  m i s s i o n  i s  t o  r e d i r e c t  m o b i l e  e l e m e n t s  i m m e d i a t e l y .  D e l a y i n g  
a c t i o n s ,  t h e  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  o f  a l l  g r o u n d  c o m b a t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  w o u l d  b e  i n  
d e m a n d .  
C r i t i c s ,  who d e p l o r e  d o c t r i n a l  a C ~ 0 m ~ O d a t i O n ~  o f  t h a t  s o r t ,  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
U.S. d e c i s i o n m a k e r s  w o u l d  d o  w e l l  t o  " r e d e s i g n  . . - o u r  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  p o s t u r e  
a n d  p o s s i b l y  o u r  d i p l o m a t i c  c o m m i t m e n t s , "  r a t h e r  t h a w  e n c o u r a g e  a " c a n - d o n  
a t t i t u d e  i n  t h e  Army t h a t  r i s k s  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n  d e f e a t  i f  c o m m i t t e d  a g a i n s t  
m a s s e d  S o v i e t  f o r c e s  i n  E u r o p e  o r  t h e  M i d d l e  E a s t .  
T A C T I C A L  A I R  FORCE PROBLEMS 
A m e r i c a ' s  t a c t i c a l  a i r  c o m b a t  a s s e t s  f u r n i s h  f l e x i b i l i t y  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  w h o s e  F r o n t a l  A v i a t i o n  ( r o u g h l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  o u r  T a c t i c a l  
A i r  Command, U.S. A i r  F o r c e  E u r o p e ,  a n d  P a c i f i c  A i r  F o r c e )  i s  l a r g e l y  
c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  E u r a s i a n  l a n d  mass. Our  c l e a r  q u a l i t a t i v e  e d g e  i s  s t i l l  
e v i d e n t  i n  m o s t  r e s p e c t s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  g a p  i s  c l o s i n g .  
S m a l l  s i z e ,  h o w e v e r ,  c r e a t e s  a n  " A c h i l l e s  h e e l w  f o r  A m e r i c a .  A f a i r l y  
s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  o u r  a c t i v e  f o r c e s  r e m a i n  u n f e t t e r e d .  R e s e r v e s  c a n  
r e s p o n d  i n  m o s t  c a s e s  o n l y  a f t e r  C o n g r e s s i o n a P  a p p r o v a l .  U.S.  t a c t i c a l  a i r  
c o m b a t  p o w e r  c o n s e q u e n t l y  c o u l d  c o p e  w i t h  a s i n g l e  l a r g e - s c a l e  c o n f l i c t  
a g a i n s t  a n y  n o n - S o v i e t  f o e ,  b u t  t h i s  C o u n t r y ' s  c r i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  e l s e w h e r e  
c o u l d  s t a r t  t o  come u n c o v e r e d .  
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  s h o r t a g e s  c o u l d  p r o v e  c r i t i c a l  i n  a  showdown w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  
U n i o n ,  s i n c e  " m a n y - o n - o n e w  s e e m s  t o  b e  M o s c o w ' s  r u l e .  T h e  f e w  U.S.  a i r c r a f t ,  
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  F r o n t a l  A v i a t i o n ,  w i l l  f i n d  i t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  p e r i l d u s  t o  c o m p e t e  
i f  c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  c o n t i n u e .  S o v i e t  m o b i l e  a i r  d e f e n s e s  f u r t h e r  u n d e r c u t  o u r  
c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
P r o j e c t e C  U.S.  p r o c u r e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  d o  l i t t l e  t o  b r i g h t e n  t h e  p i c t u r e .  
G E N E R A L  PURPOSE N A V Y  PROBLEMS 
S e a  p o w e r  i s  a n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  S o v i e t  n a v a l  n e e d s ,  by  
a n d  l a r g e ,  a r e  l e s s  c o m p e l l i n g .  
C o m m e r c e ,  a l w a y s  a  U.S. t r a d i t i o n ,  a s s u m e s  a s a l i e n t  r o l e  a s  d w i n d l i n g  
n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n c r e a s e  o u r  d e p e n d e n c e  o n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  f o r  c r i t i c a l  
s u p p l i e s .  P e t r o l e u m  p r o d u c t s  a r e  m o s t  p u b l i c i z e d ,  b u t  f o r e i g n  m i n e r a l s  a r e  
a l s o  i m p o r t a n t  t o  A m e r i c a .  R o u t e s  m u s t  t h e r e f o r e  b e  s e c u r e d  f o r  f r i e n d l y  
m e r c h a n t  s h i p s  u n d e r  a d v e r s e  c o n d i t i o n s .  E s s e n t i a l  s e a  l i n e s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m u s t  a l s o  b e  k e p t  o p e n  i n  w a r t i m e  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  f r e e  f l o w  o f  
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  a n d  l o g i s t i c  s u p p o r t  b e t w e e n  A m e r i c a ,  i t s  a l l i e s ,  a n d / o r  
c o n t e s t e d  a r e a s .  
T h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n ,  w i t h  f a r  f e w e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  f o r e i g n  raw m a t e r i a l s  
a n d  i n t r i n s i c  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  c e n t e r  o n  t h e  E u r a s i a n  l a n d  m a s s ,  h a s  o n l y  
r e c e n t l y  b e g u n  t o  b r e a k  o u t  o f  i t s  c o n t i n e n t a l  c o c o o n .  I t s  Navy i s  s t i l l  
c a s t  a s  a s p o i l e r  t h a t  e m p h a s i z e s  n e g a t i v e  s e a  d e n i a l ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  p o s i t i v e  
s e a  a s s e r t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
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The "Neww Soviet Navy 
The modern Soviet Navy is an innovative Service consciously designed to 
serve Soviet purposes rather than match its U.S. counterpart. Its focus 
since the early 1960s has shifted from coastal defense to sea-based 
deterrence in peacetime and power projection in event of nuclear,war. Such a 
transformation in such a short space of time is close to unprecedented. 
The "new9' Soviet Navy suffers from several chronic shortcomings that it 
shares with the "oldw. All Soviet surface ships, for example, would have to 
contend with lack of air cover if they swept far from friendly shores. 
 and-based bombers for area defense are poor substitutes for 
defenses-in-depth that feature carrier-based fighters. 
Soviet naval forces are also short on stamina, except for late-model ships 
such as Kiev, Kara, and Krivak. Small surface combatants, lacking large fuel 
capacities or nuclear power, have limited ranges. Restricted space for 
rations, ammunition, and other stores prohibit prolonged operations without 
resupply. Merchant tankers routinely refuel' Soviet ships at sea, and 
trawlers serve some logistic purposes, but underway replenishment procedures 
are substandard compared with U.S. skills. Lengthy, large-scale operations 
would be next to impossible in sea areas remote from friendly port 
facilities. 
Strengths, however, may well outweigh those weaknesses. 
Tactical strike capabilities of the new Soviet Navy Center on cruise 
missiles, which Fleet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov feels are llpractically 
unstoppable1' against floating targets. As he sees it, not even 
well-screened, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers could withstand assaults - 
"delivered by a group of ships armed with cruise missiles." 
Soviet attack submarines outnumber U.S. contingents by more than 3:l. 
Most are diesel-powered, and many are well past their prime, but 76 were 
fitted to fire anti-ship cruise missiles in January 1981. Tubes totalled 
432. Papa and Charlie classes can shoot from submerged positions. All 
Classes carry torpedoes for close combat. Thirty-three U.S. submarines 
mounted 132 Harpoon launchers. They are substantially outranged. 
Cruise Missile Threat to U.S. Surface Navy 
More than fifteen- sorts of Soviet surface warships, submarines, and 
aircraft carry at least one kind of cruise missile. Soviet strategy seems 
designed to seize and secure initiative with a single killing salvo. 
Missile-carrying surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, moving without 
tactical formation, could trigger surprise, preemptive strikes on signal, 
converging on targets from many directions, and perhaps from point-blank 
range. 
U.S. sea control tactics traditionally try to destroy enemy weapons before 
they endanger our ships. First strike assaults by Soviet cruise missiles, 
launched at close range, could make that approach obsolete. 
Our Navy as yet has no satisfactory solution. Current ship-launched SAMs 
would be essentially ineffective against concerted attacks. The time from 
detection to target engagement is excessive and coordination among missile 
batteries on different ships is poor. These difficulties are compounded by 
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SAM vulnerability to electronic counter-measures. Even Phoenix-armed F - 1 4 s '  
which can engage six targets simultaneously, are subject to easy saturation 
if large-scale attacks box the compass. 
Threats to Merchant Shipping 
Successful ASW operations depend on abilities to find, fix, and finish 
enemy undersea raiders before they can wreak heavy damage. Prospects for 
U.S. success are more favorable than they were a few years ago, b u t  
breakthroughs in detection are still in the blueprint stage. Beyond that, 
the small size of America's specialized force causes concern. ASW is mainly 
a time-consuming matter of attrition, in which numbers count more and more as 
friendly losses mount. Some authorities conclude that America at most might 
sink 20% of all opposing submarines before the Soviets took serious toll 
among merchantmec. Consequently, Soviet capacities to interfere with U.S. 
lifelines at sea could prove to be low-cost, low-risk operations under 
certain circumstances, at least as long as a "Mexican standoffw persists a t  
strategic nuclear levels. 
T h e  Upshot 
America's Navy, which matches a three-ocean mission with a 
one-and-a-half-ocean capability, is marginally capable of carrying out its 
mission in support of national strategy. Its forces are stretched so thin 
that further peacetime forward deployments could be attained only at great 
expense to personnel and equipment by drawing down reserves to a dangerous 
extent or uncovering existing commitments. Wartime attrition is an 
unpropitious prospect. 
Serious students of naval strategy sum up the current situation with one 
succinct statement: the U.S. Navy now enters an era of reduced options and 
reinforced risk. 
AMPHIBIOUS ABILITIES 
The U.S. Marine Corps, with a total personnel strength slightly exceeding 
188,000, comprises three active and one reserve divisions, together with 
associated air wings and combat/service support. Six naval infantry 
regiments, the closest Soviet counterpart, contain fewer than 2,000 men each, 
with minimum fire support. 
Comparative power projection possibilities, however, are not quite a s  
lopsided as that picture seems to paint. 
U.S. amphibious assault abilities are strictly abridged by the shortage of 
specialized sealift. Current assets are confined to 61 ships, of which 15% 
are normally in overhaul. That level is sufficient for short-notice landings 
by battalions and brigades, but a single Marine division/wing team would 
absorb all but four operational ships, which are scattered from Manila to the 
Mediterranean. Lead times for assembly would be long, and combat losses 
irreplaceable. Prepositioned supplies on ships alleviate lift requirements 
to some extent, but are no substitute for amphibious assault capabilities. 
Amphibious sealift for Soviet naval infantry features coastal landing 
craft, along with the Ivan Rogov (an LPD) and 25 LSTs. That shortcoming 
makes long-distance operations infeasible for the full force, but the 
combination is well-suited for commando-style raids and amphibious assaults 
close to Soviet flanks. Reinforcements, if required, could arrive on 
merchant ships. 
MOBILITY TRENDS 
Intercontinental lift over open oceans is a U.S. essential. Russian 
requirements thus far have been more regional. Dissimilar demands, coupled 
with policy peculiarities and geographic circumstance, consequently foster 
mobility force structures that are quite different in size as well as 
composition, 
U.S. AIRLIFT PROBLEMS 
America's air mobility means are still peerless, in large part because our 
Defense Department has accented "airlift enhancementw programs since the 
early 1960s. Soviet counterparts are improving, but present capabilities are 
comparable only along that country's periphery. 
Still, 70 C-5s, the only aircraft that can carry outsize cargo, constrain 
our abilities to meet NATO reinforcement/resupply schedules or to support 
rapid deployment forces, say, in the Middle East. They are complemented by 
234 C-141s. No more of either type are being manufactureb. Losses from 
combat attrition or maintenance failures thus are irreplaceable. U.S. 
tactical airlift assets, long the world's best, are showing signs of age. 
U.S. SEALIFT PROBLEMS 
U.S. sealift consistently gets short shrift. Interest in the 1960s 
Centered on quick reaction instead of sustained support, but few funds were 
forthcoming for forces afloat, even for that purpose. Assets, which reached 
their apogee during World War 11, consequently have been on a for three 
decades. 
The conversion has been from many ships to few; from military ships to 
civilian carriers; from U.S. ships to foreign flags; from general cargo to 
container ships; from small, adaptable ships to large ones whose applications 
are limited. Our "mothball" fleet, which served well during-the Vietnam War', 
is seriously depleted. Those trends in combination make it infeasible for 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the U.S. Merchant Marine to satisfy 
large-scale contingency requirements without massive aid from allies. 
Sealift "dehancement" continues as a long-term trend. 
The balance between Soviet strategic airlift and sealift is precisely 
opposite. Moscow's merchant fleet, already much larger than our own, is 
increasing capabilities at a rapid rate. Ship characteristics are chosen 
carefully to serve politico-military as well as economic purposes, especially 
in areas where large, specialized vessels can not conveniently venture. 
COM?ARATPVE FLEXIBILITY 
Composite Soviet mobility forces are sufficient to influence a range of 
low-key contingencies in widely-separated areas, from Angola to Afghanistan, 
but airlift/sea%ift shortages are still strong limiting factors for major 
military o'perations almost anywhere outside the home country or contiguous 
satellites. 
Quickand efficient logistic support for allies is a U.S. airlift 
specialty. MACss squadrons also afford laudable (although limited) means of 
reinforcing forward deployed forces rapidly or shifting sizable combat power 
anywhere in the world. Apparent flexibility, however, is conditioned by the 
dearth of merchant shipping, which makes it almost impossible to sustain 
major efforts without allied assistance. That combination calls for caution 
under most conceivable circumstances, since aid is not assured. 
OVERARCHING POLICY PROBLEMS 
Two overarching policy problems inhibit solutions to U.S. shortcomings 
just described. 
BUDGETARY BREAKOUTS 
The price tag for U.S. manpower dedicated to defense has been the dominant 
budgetary factor influencing the configuration and flexibility of America's 
conventional forces during the past decade, given fiscal constraints imposed 
by official policy. Inflation, coupled with attempts to compete with 
domestic pay scales, caused most of the problem. A retiree population 
expanding exponentially also contributed. The biggest budgetary boost came 
in Nov. 1971, to start our All-Volunteer Force (AVF) off on the proper foot. 
Pay and allowances alone (including civilians) absorbed more than half of 
DOD's money for several years, before that proportion subsided somewhat. 
Percentage expenses for manpower, including outlays devoted to recruiting, 
construction, and dependent care, have stabilized, but costs continue to 
climb in response to periodic pay raises. (Pay for an entry-level enlisted 
man or woman now is $501 a month, as opposed to $21 for counterparts in the 
pre-World-War-I1 AVF. Soviet recruits receive an amount roughly equivalent 
to $5.50 a month.) Cumulative consequences currently cause personnel to 
consume about 50 cents of every defense dollar. 
Inescapable expenditures for non-manpower-related operations an8 
maintenance (O&M) approximate 15 cents more, a percentage that has proved 
inadequate, given budgetary restrictuions in recent years. U.S. readiness to 
implement contingency plans is subject to serious criticism as a consequence. 
The remaining third must be split between procurement programs, which 
shape our present posture, research and development (R&D) which, in large 
part, determines our strength tomorrow, and military construction. The 
implications are inimical, because the Soviet Union devotes a much smaller 
proportion of its defense budget to manpower than the United States. Perhaps 
20% is a fair approximation. Moscow, therefore, could afford a larger force 
and modernize at more rapid rates if its total defense budget were exactly 
the same as that of the United States, since a much greater share of its 
money can be spent on nachi3es. 
DECLINING DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY 
The United States starts with the world's richest reservoir of scientific 
resources. Constant feedback between civil and military markets encourages 
entrepreneurism and technological chain reactions not remotely equalled by 
our Russian rival.' As a result, options still closed to the Soviets are 
completely open to us. 
This country's predominance, however, shows signs of perishability that 
makes many intellectuals lament our lack of momentum. 
Causes include uncertain goals that make it troublesome to chart a sound 
course for defense technology. Insistence on practical products is 
pronounced. Fund requests for abstract research are frequently cut or 
cancelled. Sharp fiscal caution extends to other R&D sectors. Consequent 
tendencies to tolerate few failures sometimes impede rapid progress. 
Basic Research 
U.S. superiority in basic research still seems substantial. This country 
Clearly excells in 24 bellweather programs, the Soviets in 14: 
Present Status 
United States Superior 
Lead Solid 13 
Lead Shaky 
Total 
Soviet Union Superior 
Lead Solid 14 
Lead Shaky - 0
Total 14 
America's temporary purchase, however, is no 'cause for complacency. The 
U.S. lead is solid in Only slightly more than half of those cases (13 out of 
24). Opposing scientists, who are closing the gap in 11, protect Soviet 
primacy in every instance. 
Relative U.S./Soviet ranks would reverse if straight-line projections of 
those trends continued: 
Projected Status 
United States Superior 
Present Lead Solid 13 
Subsequent Gain - 0
Total 13 
Soviet Union Superior 
Present Lead Solid 14 
Subsequent Gain - 11
Total 25 
Soviet enterprise would take the technological lead by 25 to 13, where it 
now lags by much that same margin. Assuming that six entries currently 
carried as "parity" or "uncertainn shifted in U.S. favor, we still could not 
reach Russia's level in basic research (19 to 25). 
Applied Technology 
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish findarnental superiority (a 
function of creativity) from design philosophy and restraints imposed by 
funds when assessing applied technology. This study makes no attempt to 
differentiate- It concentrates instead on practical products that are now, 
or soon could, influence the U.S./Soviet military balance. Supremacy that 
might have been, has no practical value. Each nation either applies 
technology effectively, or it does not. 
Soviet forces presently deploy a smorgasbord of brand-new systems based en 
technology well known in the West, but slightly exploited. Significant 
samples include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBHs) with "cold 
launchw capabilities; mobile air defenses that can move with ground troops; 
satellite intercept and surveillance craft; armored vehicles and surface 
ships engineered expressly to operate in chemical/biological warfare 
environments; rapid-fire rocket launchers; and fire-control systems unmatched 
either by this country or other NATO members. 
U.S. preeminence is undisputed in 35 signal instances, the Soviets in 28, 
but the situation promises to become increasingly unstable as the 1980s 
progress, given opposing prospects: 
Present Status 
United States Superior 
Lead Solid 18 
Lead Shaky 
Total 
Soviet Union Superior 
Lead Solid 23 
Lead Shaky 
Total 
America's present lead is solid in about 50% of the cases (18 out of 3 5 ) .  
The Soviet side, gaining relative strength in the remaining 17, safeguards 
its top-flight ratings in all but five instances. 
U.S./Soviet ranks would more than reverse if straight-line projections sf 
those trends continued: 
Projected Status 
United States Superior 
Present Lead Solid 18 
Subsequent Gain - 05
Total 2 3 
Soviet Union Superior 
Present Lead Solid 23 
Subsequent Gain - 17
Total 40 
Moscow would take the technological lead by 40 to 23, where it now lags by 
much less than that margin. Assuming four entries currently classified as 
"parity" or "uncertainw crossed into U.S. columns, we still would be behind 
by 40 to 27. 
CAPSTONE 
It is possible to quibble about classifications in the foregoing 
assessment, contesting whether proper categories have been included. 
Conclusions drawn are debatable at best, because one weakness may outweigh a 
dozen strengths, or vice versa. Some lags on each side are deliberate, 
caused at least as much by different missions and developmental styles as by 
asymmetries in competence or failures to foresee demands. 
Still, if Soviet skills are overstated by, say, 25%, the day has passed 
when the United States could be smugly sure of unquestioned scientific and 
technological superiority, which has sustained this country in the past and 
is the key to future capabilities. 
Positive steps will be required to retain the present U.S. stance, let 
alone improve our posture. Gray matter is more important than money when it 
comes to closing gaps. Success depends on strategists who understand the 
competition working in tandem with technologists to pick priorities that make 
research and requirements match, while reducing blind leads that waste time 
and resources. Perhaps most of all, the potential for superiority will prove 
meaningless, if we fail to compete. 
CULMINATING COMMENTS 
changes since the Cuban missile crisis favor the Soviet 
Union. U.S. salitative superiority, less pronounced than in the past, is 
slipping away. 
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
Two legs of our strategic nuclear triad are shaky. SLBMs, according to 
widespread belief,-may become the only secure mainstay for some interim 
period, at least until air-launched cruise missiles enter the U.S. inventory 
in large numbers about the mid-1980s. 
U.S. nuclear strategy disregards defense. The American people and 
proauction base are exposea completely to ballistic missile attack. Their 
ability to survive a full-scale nuclear assault by the Soviet Union is nearly 
nil. 
Resultant vulnerabilities drastically reduce the credibility of U.S. 
promises to provide a nuclear vumbrellaw for allies. We no longer could 
unlease assured destruction strikes against the Soviet Union to defend NATO 
or Asian friends without risking reciprocal devastation. 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons were practical deterrent and defensive tools 
two decades ago, when we could clamp a lid on local escalation by threatening 
to level the Soviet Union if its leaders employed counterpart systems. NATO 
allies in particular would have little to gain and a lot to lost today if we 
turned loose the theater nuclear genie, since war would take place largely on 
their home territory, where both people and possessions are unprotected. 
Plans predicated on nuclear options in the absence of effective defense 
for ourselves or affiliates thus fail to inspire desired degrees of 
confidence at any employment level. 
CHEMICAL/SIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES 
America's chemical/biological warfare (CB) capabilities, never 
considerable, are now next to nonexistent. We have no offensive forces in 
that medium which might make the Kremlin fear starting a fray it could not 
finish. U.S. defense is diffident. 
CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Quantitative asymmetries are important when similar systems on each side 
(such a s  divisions) compete with each other in combat. Quality counts, but a 
prudent statistical balance must be maintained, because there are points 
beyond which mass matters more than excellence. Land, sea, and air forces 
alike lack flexibility if numbers are too few compared with competitors and 
commitments. 
Our All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is too small to dispose of even one 
extensive contingency without reducing the required CONUS rotation base 
and/or uncovering commitments in other regions. It cannot absorb many more 
tanks, ships, and planes, because members are scarcely sufficient to maintain 
and operate machines now in service. The number of U.S. divisions, aircraft 
squadrons, and carrier task forces would remain close to constant if the AVP 
were filled to authorized capacity with high performance personnel. 
7 
Attrition could take its toll quickly in all four U.S- military services 
and the U.S. Merchant Marine, which is also at a low level. Planned 
employment of Army reserve components or the National Defense Reserve Fleet 
to reinforce active strength and replace combat casualties early in any 
high-intensity conflict appears impractical, given depleted ranks and rather 
low states of readiness. 
COLLECTIVE IMPLICATIONS 
In short, current trends curtail U.S. freedom of action. The upshot 
abridges abilities of U.S. armed services to deter attacks on the Unite6 
States, defend this country effectively if deterrence should fail, and 
safeguard associates whose security is closely linked with our own. 
Those trends will be hard to reverse because: 
-- High manpower costs inhibit force modernization much more in 
the United States than in the Soviet Union. 
-- U.S. technological supremacy shows signs of perishability that 
results more from policies than potential. 
Most corrective options are politically and economically unattractive, but 
some current courses could prove unacceptable in the absence of change. 
Step One in the process of obtaining a better balance between American and 
Soviet military strength is to ascertain our true requirements, based on 
imperative U.S. interests, objectives, and commitments. Step Two is to 
reshape U.S. interests, objectives, and may be essential, but bolstering 
budgets would produce few benefits unless coupled with sound strategy. 
Sound conclusions would allow the Congress and the executive branch in 
concert to chart a course that assures America's ability to deter and, if 
need be, defend successfully against any sort of Soviet armed aggression into 
the Twenty-first Century. 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
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TACTICAL AIR FORCES 
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S h o r t - r a n g e  S o v i e t  SS-N-1 c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  d e p l o y e d  o n  K i l d e n  a n d  
K r u p n y  d e s t r o y e r s  w e r e  p r i m a r i l y  a n t i - s h i p  w e a p o n s ,  b u t  a l s o  
h a d  a  n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t y  a g a i n s t  s h o r e  t a r g e t s .  U.S.  c r u i s e  
mi s s i l e s  w e r e  i n  a S n a r k  s q u a d r o n  a t  P r e s q u e  I s l e ,  H a i n e .  T h e i r  
r a n g e  was a b o u t  5 , 5 0 0  nm. 
S i x  S o v i e t  Zu lu -V s u b m a r i n e s ,  w i t h  t w o  SS-N-4 SLBMs a p i e c e ,  w e r e  
d e p l o y e d  i n  t h e  % a t e  1 9 5 0 s .  T e n  G u l f - I  a n d  t w o  H o t e l - P  c o m p a n i o n s ,  
e a c h  w i t h  t h r e e  SS-N-4 m i s s i l e s ,  h a d  b e e n  c o m m i s s i o n e d  b y  1 9 6 0 .  
A l l  h a d  t o  s u r f a c e  f o r  f i r i n g .  
U.S. f i g u r e s  i n c l u d e  i n t e r c e p t o r  a i r c r a f t  a n d  S A M  s y s t e m s  i n  Army 
a n d  A i r  F o r c e  r e s e r v e  c o m p o n e n t s .  
I n c l u d e s  t w o  J u p i t e r  s q u q d r o n s  i n  I t a l y  ( t o t a l  25  m i s s i l e s )  a n d  
o n e  i n  T u r k e y  ( 2 6  m i s s l e s ) .  E x c l u d e s  T h o r  I R B M s ,  s e n t  t o  G r e a t  
B r i t a i n ,  b e c a u s e  t h e y  p a s s e d  t o  R o y a l  A i r F o r c e  ( R A F )  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
b e c o m i n g  o p e r a t i o n a .  
U.S. t a n k s  i n c l u d e d  1 2 , 5 0 0  Army a n d  4 7 5  M a r i n e .  
U.S. f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  i n c l u d e d  1 , 1 8 0  A i r  F o r c e  a n d  6 2 5  M a r i n e .  
T h e  s a m e  S o v i e t  m e d i u m - r a n g e  b o m b e r s  show i n  s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  
a n d  t a c t i c a l  a i r  f o r c e  c a t e g o r i e s . .  
K h r u s h c h e v ' s  p l a n  t o  s c r a p  c r u i s e r s ,  r e s i s t e d  b y  F l e e t  A d m i r a l  
G o r s h k o v ,  was s t i l l  i n  g e s t a t i o n  when t h e  1 9 6 0 s  s t a r t e d .  
R e t i r e m e n t s  r e d u c e d  t h e  t o t a l  t o  1 9  by  1 9 6 4 .  
S o v i e t  n a v a l  i n f a n t r y ,  w h i c h  saw s e r v i c e  d u r i n g  W o r l d  War 11, 
w e r e  n o n e x i s t e n t  i n  1 9 6 0 .  S m a l l  r e g i m e n t s  w e r e  r e a c t i v e a t e d  i n  
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 2 .  L a n d i n g  C r a f t  U t i l i t y  ( L C U s )  w e r e  t h e  l a r g e s t  
a v - a i l a b l e  l i f t .  
( 1 0 )  S o v i e t  l a n d - b a s e d  n a v a l  a i r c r a f t ,  w h i c h  e x c e e d e d  1 , 0 0 0  i n  t h e  
% a t e  l 9 5 0 s ,  r e d u c e d  r a p i d l y  a f t e r  f i g h t e r  s q u a d r o n s  s h i f t e d  
s u b o r d i n a t i o n  t o  t h e  P V O  ( a i r  d e f e n s e ) .  T h o s e  shown a b o v e  a r e  
a l l  a n t i - s h i p  b o m b e r s .  
(11) E x c l u d e s  U.S.  C i v i l  R e s e r v e  A i r  F l e e t  (CRAF) a n d  S o v i e t  A e r o f l o t .  
I n c l u d e s  a c t i v e ,  r e s e r v e ,  s t r a t e g i c ,  a n d  t a c t i c a l  a i r l i f t .  S o v i e t  

















Strategic Defensive Systems 
ABM Launchers 4 
SAM Launchers 4 





























Antitank Guided Missiles 
Heavy Mortars 11 
Tactical Ballistic Missiles 12 




















Antitank Guided Missiles 
Heavy Mortars 
Current Status 
U.S. U.S.S.W, U.S. Standing 
Category 
NAVAL FORCES (General Purpose) 








































U.S. U.S-S.R. U.S. Standing 
Category Current Status 
U.S, U.S.S.W. U.S. Standing 
TACTICAL AIR FORCES 














UtiPity/~argo Helicopters 2 0  
SEALIFT 









Amphibious Ships 22 
NOTES : 
1 
A - Includes 15 Soviet G-class diesel submarines. 
2. Strategic bombers include B-52, PB-111, Bear, Bison, and 
Backfire (less those assigned to Soviet naval aviation). 
3. U . S .  bomber loads are based on an average of 2 bombs per FB-111; 
4 bombs per B-52, plus a variable number of SRAMs (1,150 from 
1976-1980). One large bomb or air-to-surface missile (ASM) 
per Bear and Bison; 2 ASMs per Backfire. 
All Hawk and Nike Hercules SkMs number zero as of Apr. 9, 1979. 
U.S. interceptor aircraft include Air National Guard. 
Manpower figures are in thousands. 
U.S. Army deployable manpower includes mission-oriented 
base operating support. Soviet strengths exclude command 
and general support. 
U.S. Army manpower excludes strategic nuclear forces. 
Soviet Strengths exclude paramilitary Border Guards and 
internal security troops, which total 459,000. 
U.S. light tanks include Sheridan armored assault vehicles. 
U.S. entries exclude wheeled vehicles. Soviet figures include 
them, since the characteristics are quite different. 
- 
Heavy mortars include U.S. 4.2-inch, Soviet 120mm and 240mm. 
Tactical ballistic missiles include U.S- Pershing, Lance, and 
Honest John, Soviet FROG, SCUD, ScaleSoard, and SS-21. 
U.S. Marines exclude air wings. 
Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel (LVTP). 
U.S. destroyer figure counts 16 in Naval Reserves. 
37 U.S. frigates were armed with Harpoon missiles as of January 1981 
Soviet small combatants include Nanuchka and Sarancha SSM boats, 
and Grisha and Pots. U.S. figures exclude 116 Coast Guard cutters 
and patrol boats. 
Air force manpower figures for both sides exclude strategic 
nuclear forces and include airlift forces. 
Includes Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Marine 
Corps Reserve. 
U.S. cargo/utility helicopters include 4,550 Army and 296 Marine. 
U.S. merchant cargo ships and tankers include those in 
Military Sealift Command, the rest of our Merchant Marine, the 
Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet, and National Defense Reserve 
Fleet. 
U.S. amphibious ships include 12 helicopter carriers. Soviet 
figures count 50 air cushion vehicles. 
LEGISLATION 
Department of Defense Supplemental Authorization Act, 198%. Authorizes 
the appropriation of additional funds for FY81 for the use of the armed 
forces for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat 
vehicles and for research, development, test, and evaluation. Increases the 
active duty personnel and strengths of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. 
Increases the number of reserve component members authorized to serve on 
full-time duty with the Marine Corps Reserve. Increases the number sf 
civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense. H.W. 2614 
introduced Mar. 18, 1981; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. 
Reported to the House (H-Rept. 97-20), with amendment, Apr. 9. S. 694 
introduced Mar. 12, 198%; referred to the Committee on Armed Services. 
Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 97-35), with amendment, Apr. l. Passed 
Senate, amended, May 7, 1981. Passed the House, amended, June 23, in li@u sf 
H.R. 2614. Conferences held; conf@rence report filed in the House (H.Rept- 
97-204) July 27, to which both Houses agreed. Signed into law Aug. 14,  
1981. 
P . L .  97-86, S. 815 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982. Authorizes appropriations 
for the armed forces for procurement for aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, 
tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, for research, 
development, test, and evaluation, and for operation and maintenance- 
Prescribes authorized end strengths for active duty, reserve, and civilian 
pePSOnne1. H.R. 2970 introduced Apr. 1 ,  1981; referred to Committee on Armed 
Services. Clean bill H.R. 3519 reported to the House (H.Rept. 97-71, part 
l), with amendment, May 12. Referred to the Committees on the Judiciary and 
on Government Operations. S. 815 introduced Mar. 26, 1981; referred to the 
Committee on Armed Services. Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 97-58), with 
amendment, May 6. Called up by unanimous consent in Senate; passed the 
Senate, amended, May 14, 1981. Passed the House, amended, July 1 6 #  in lieu 
of H.R. 3519. Conferences held. Conference report filed in the House 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/20/81 -- President Reagan's proposal for the withdrawal of U.S. 
and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe was 
called a "welcome change" to his earlier "bellicose" 
statements, according to Soviet Communist Party official 
Vadim Zagladin. 
11/18/81 -- President Reagan proposed cancelling deployment of 572 
new cruise and ~ e r s h i n g  XI missiles in Europe if the 6QQ 
Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missiles 
deployed in the western Soviet Union are dismantled. 
11/06/81 -- Secretary of State Haig asserted that the Soviet Union has 
a three-to-one numerical advantage over the United States in 
missiles and aircraft in Europe. This came in response to 
Eeonid Brezhnev's statement that "approximate paritygv 
exists between the two superpowers in the European 
theater. 
1Q/31/81 -- "We have a real necessity to increase the size and 
strength of all our military forces," said Secretary 
of Defense Weinberger. "We need to do it by 
rearming ourselves to meet the serious and very imminent 
danger*' of the'Soviet military threat. 
09/30/81 -- Pravda rejected as "routine fabrication" the new 
DOD report Soviet Military Power. According to the 
Communist Party newspaper, the booklet intends to 
"fool" U.S. allies and disguise American efforts to 
gain strategic superiority. 
09/23/81 -- Defense Secretary Weinberger testified that the 
Administration's defense budget cuts will necessitate 
eliminating an army combat division, 30 ships, 
all Titan ICBMs, and the oldest B-52 bombers. 
09/20/81 -- Ex-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that the 
Reagan Administration's campaign to modernize 
U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be to the 
detriment of the United States' ability to 
wage conventional war. In an interview Brown said, 
"If we engage in a fruitless search for strategic 
superiority, we will escalate strategic force 
expenditures unnecessarily, and deprive our 
conventional forces." 
09/05/81 -- According to a Defense Intelligence Agency report 
to Congress, the Soviet Union outproduces the United 
States as much as 3:l in "most" strategic and 
tactical weapons. This assessment includes tanks, 
fighter planes, short-range ballistic missiles, 
and submarine launched ballistic missiles. 
07/19/81 -- Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet armed forces chief of staff, 
indicated the Soviet Union has begun a buildup of 
strategic nuclear forces in response to U.S. attempts 
to gain military superiority. In an article in 
Kommunist, he said, "special attention is being 
given to... the strategic nuclear forces, which 
serve as the basic factor to deter an aggressor." 
06/28/81 -- The Navy proposed an expanded shipbuilding plan which 
calls for the construction of 143 ships, including 
two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. This proposal 
is 75% larger than the last 5-year construction plan 
of President Carter. 
04/15/81 -- The Soviet Union is "plainly ready to apply force in 
support of political aims," according to a study by 
the British Ministry of Defense. The report proclaimed 
"broad parity" between the East and West in strategic 
nuclear weapons. 
02/06/81 -- "The U.S. Navy is unable fully to meet its peacetime 
commitments," according to Chief of Naval Operations 
Thomas Hayward. Testifying before Congress Hayward 
stated "I'm not saying we're inferior to the Soviet 
Navy . But I am saying that the gray area between 
superiority and inferiority is large enough today that 
it is ambiguous in terms of a professional assessment 
of who's ahead and who's behind. Our margin of comfort 
is totally gone." 
01/29/81 -- "Detente's been a one-way street the Soviet Union has 
used to pursue its own aims, "President Reagan asserted 
when asked about future U.S.-Soviet relations. 
"...the only morality they recognize is what will 
further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves 
the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat." 
01/28/81 -- "In a simplistic way the Soviets are aheadw militarily, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones stated in 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
The United States is not strong enough to repel a 
Soviet invasion in the Persian Gulf region, according ' 
to Jones, who advocates retaliating to attack in a 
theater where the United States has a military 
advantage. 
09/18/80 -- The United States and its allies are trailing the Soviet 
Union and its satellites in nuclear and conventional 
weapons, according to The Military Balance 1980-81, 
compiled by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. 
09/08/80 -- Only four of the Army's ten CONUS-based divisions are 
combat-ready, according to a confidential Pentagon 
report. Three of the four are rated 
combat-ready, but with major deficiencies. The 
82nd Airborne is ready-for-combat with minor 
deficiencies. Two of the three divisions earmarked 
as potential components of the Rapid .Deployment 
Force, the lOlst Air Assault and 24th Infantry,.were 
rated unready for combat. 
08/21/80 -- The United States could win an arms race with the 
Soviets, President Carter stated in defense of his 
military policies. "We have strengthened every 
single element of our strategic deterrent... and if 
an unlimited nuclear arms race should be forced upon 
us, we will compete and compete successfu$ly." 
06/18/80 -- The DOE announced it will not be able to produce all 
the nuclear weapons the President has requestea unless 
it receives an additional $250 million in FY81. 
According to one DOE official "The Defense Department 
gives orders for warheads but they don't have to pay 
for them. We are the ones who have to trade them off 
against civilian requirements.q' 
06/16/50 -- An oil shortage seriously hampers U.S. armed forces 
readiness, according to a report issued by the House 
Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee. DOD 
petroleum stocks fell 6% from '78 to '79, which resulted 
in drawing from war reserve stocks to sustain 
peacetime operations. 
03/20/80 -- The Soviet Union announced that it is going to 
dismantle half of its existing antiballistic missile 
defense sites around Moscsw. Within the guidelines 
of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, a component of 
SALT I ,  the Soviet Union has deployed 64 ABM launchers 
around Moscow. The Soviet representative making the 
announcement did not say, however, whether Moscow 
intends to modernize the 32 launchers to accommodate 
new missiles, or to abolish them altogether, 
03/17/80 -- About half of the United States' first-line warplanes 
Cannot fly be-cause the Pentagon has concentrated on 
buying new aircraft rather than procuring spare parts 
to maintain existing ones, according to a study by the 
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The study 
found that only 53% of the F-15 Eagle and F-14 Tomcat 
were ready for combat at any given time in 1979. Rep. 
Jack Edwards, ranking minority member of the Subcommittee 
stated "It makes no sense whatsoever to buy all 
these very costly aircraft without also buying all the 
other necessary parts and weapons that make these 
aircraft an effective combat system." 
02/28/80 -- The first XM-1 Main Battle Tank rolled off the production 
line in Lima, Ohio. Although the tank is in production, 
it will retain an experimental status until it has 
completed its operational test about a year from now. 
During the 1980s, 7,058 XM-1s are scheduled to be built. 
02/20/80 -- Gen. Richard Ellis, Commander in Chief of the Strategic 
Air Command, testified that "an adverse strategic 
imbalance'' favoring the Soviet Union has developed. 
Gen. Ellis stated that the imbalance exists when 
American forces are in a day-to-day alert posture 
as well as when ready for operations. 
-- Defense Under Secretary William Perry said that the 
Soviet Union is at least 5 years behind the United 
States in electronics technology. Testifying before 
a Senate subcommittee, Perry stated, "In fields 
which are of critical importance to our military 
capabilities. .. we are more than 5 years ahead of the 
Soviets." 
01/30/80 -- National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 1138-79 indicates 
that the Soviets could have 14,000 ICBM and SLBM 
warheads by 1989 if the SALT Treaty is disapproved. 
The level will otherwise be limited to about 6,000 
in 1985, when the pact, if approved, expires. 
01/29/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown, presenting his annual posture 
statement to the House Armed Services Committee, admitted 
that the U.S. "1-1/2 warw capability is only a "theoryw. 
As he put it, "our practices have not been entirely 
consistent with that policy. We have never fully 
acquired the agility and mobility required by such a 
reinforcement strategy." Moreover, he maintained, 
''we have economized on the nuts and bolts needed to 
sustain a non-nuclear conflict in a particular theater 
for more than a relatively short time." 
-- A Pravda edito'rial, on the same day that Defense - 
Secretary Brown began reporting to Congress on the 
military balance, bluntly stated that the United 
States can no longer count on clear, worldwide 
military dominance, because Soviet power now can 
block U.S. moves and accomplish its own purposes. 
Waning U.S. power and increasing Soviet military might 
is a fact of life. Pravda is the official Soviet 
Communist Party newspaper. 
06/25/79 -- The Soviet Union is developing two new types of . 
strategic bombers and modifying the Tupelov Backfire, 
according to a Soviet negotiator for SALT 11. 
The disclosure was made to American representatives 
at Geneva during technical talks that preceded the 
signing of SALT 11. 
00/00/62 -- Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov agreed 
to remove Soviet missiles and bombers from Cuba, 
but warned: "Never will we be caught like this 
again. " 
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